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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of excise duty increases on the retail price of gasoline and diesel in the Czech 
Republic. This study is primarily concerned with the issue of tax burden shifting because of transport fuel excise duties. This 
paper analyses the tax shifting process by focusing on periodic excise duty increases to identify whether overshifting occurs and 
what the consequences are for the Pigovian principle of environmental taxation. The research results show that overshifting of tax 
burden occurs with gradual tax rate increases in selected countries. Therefore, this enables it to be emphasized that overshifting 
violates the rationale of corrective taxation, increasing the distortionary effects of environmental taxes and substantially 
decreasing taxes’ efficiency in pollution abatement. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
The paper is primarily concerned with the process of tax shifting and the interaction with the Pigovian principle 
that underlies corrective levies such as environmental taxation. To emphasize the potential threats to environmental 
taxation, this study relies on both theoretical and empirical analysis of the market reaction to the modifications of 
corrective taxation rates. 
Although the theoretical portion relies on the debate regarding the tax shifting process, the empirical research is 
based on analyzing the impact of periodical increases of transport fuel excise duties on retail prices with the 
objective of determining the size of the tax burden shift, considering this process to be the main trigger that drives 
the tax incidence. Consequently, this paper attempts to establish a connection between tax shifting and its impact on 
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the fundamental rationale of corrective taxation. The starting point relies on the analysis of excise duties as an 
instrument of choice, which we assume to be the appropriate proxy for environmental taxation. The main purpose of 
levying those selective taxes is to discourage individuals from consuming harmful goods to decrease the associated 
negative externalities. The rationale behind a fossil fuel excise tax (mainly gasoline and diesel excise duty) is to 
preserve oil resources, to decrease pollution and to protect the environment. Therefore, we understand environmental 
taxation to be an excise duty-based corrective tax. Our research’s objective is to identify whether overshifting indeed 
occurs, indicated by retail price increases greater than the excise duty tax increase. 
The first section of this paper reviews the empirical research papers that analyze the tax burden shifting of 
indirect taxation. The objective of the second section of this paper is an empirical analysis using multiple variable 
regressions and testing for cointegration regarding the non-stationary time series used for each selected country. It is 
necessary to note that in comparison with current literature, our paper represents the first study that establishes a 
connection between the potential overshifting of tax burden for environmental taxes and the effects on the Pigovian 
principle that underlie the corrective taxation. Although there are primary studies focused on the issue of 
overshifting of transport fuels, their assessment ignored the impact of overshifting on the rationale that governs the 
Pigovian environmental taxation.  
2. Literature Review 
The issue of tax shifting was also analyzed in detail by Seligman (1927), who attempted to note the difference 
between the concepts of shifting and tax incidence. He stresses that the shifting of tax is the process and tax 
incidence is the result, in which the changes in the distribution of wealth are the final effect. Therefore, the debate 
regarding the incidence intimately depends on the investigation of tax shifting. In case of general commodities, tax 
shifting strictly depends on the elasticity of demand (Seligman, 1927). This ranges from cases located at opposite 
poles, inelastic demand where full-shifting occurs, moderate elasticity where the burden is equally shared between 
producer and consumer and perfectly elastic demand where no forward shifting occurs and the producer/seller fully 
bears the tax burden. 
The economic literature tends to focus its research on extremes, such as monopoly and perfect competition 
markets. There are few economists who choose to analyze the in-between situations such as oligopoly. One notable 
research paper that stresses the implication of taxation in an oligopolistic framework is by Katz and Rosen (1983). 
The authors analyze the process of tax shifting in the conjectural variations of oligopoly settings.  
Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) consider that overshifting occurs because of the market power and strategic 
behavior between companies. In situations in which the company shifts the tax burden forward by increasing the 
price level, the demand for its products will decrease, thus overshifting appears to be a method to compensate for the 
revenue lost from the decreased demand as an effect of tax imposition. The process of overshifting occurs most 
likely if the demand elasticity with regard to price fluctuation is relatively inelastic. Analyzing the different impacts 
of ad valorem and ad unit taxation on welfare, Myles (1995) considers that in an imperfect competitive economy, it 
is not the presence of profits per se that leads to allocation distortions but rather the pricing policy that supports 
these profits. The same conclusion has been reached by Stern (1986); the author states that an excise tax may 
increase profits if the elasticity of the demand elasticity (e.g., slope of demand) is sufficiently low. Kotlikoff and 
Summers (1986) consider that ‘taxes tend to be borne by inelastic suppliers or demanders’. Hence, the tax burden is 
supported by those who cannot easily adjust in response to price increases. 
The theoretical literature focusing on the forward shifting of taxation is scarce and becomes more limited if one 
seeks to find empirical analysis that focuses on the overshifting of the tax burden. However, there are research 
papers that analyze the tax shifting of excise duties that cover a relatively large area of commodities. The most 
notable papers focus mainly on alcohol, cigarettes, fuels and other large groups of consumption goods.  
Spoerer (2007) analyses the tax overshifting in 19thcentury in Prussia, focusing mainly on the milling and 
slaughter tax. The author concludes that overshifting had occurred, creating notable distortions, because these levies 
were the most regressive in those times. Concerned with the same issue, Besley and Rosen (1999) perform an 
extensive empirical analysis on the sales tax shifting on retail prices in US, covering commodity prices from more 
than 155 US cities for the period 1982–1990. The authors find that in most cases, the tax burden was one-for-one 
shifted to final consumers. In certain cases, because of the imperfect competitive markets, the authors identified the 
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overshifting of the sales tax burden. Delipalla and O’Donnell (1998) focus on the comparison between ad valorem 
and ad unit taxation. This comparison was empirically applied using the data regarding the European cigarette 
industry. The authors conclude that in countries where there is a greater reliance on ad valorem taxes, full shifting of 
the tax burden and overshifting of specific taxation appears. The main conclusion is connected with an earlier paper 
written by Delipalla and Keen (1991) in which, for specific (e.g., unit) taxation, overshifting is more likely to occur, 
having a greater impact on prices than ad valorem tax. The authors emphasize certain notable theoretical concerns in 
which special attention should be provided to the interdependence between overshifting and the regressive impact of 
taxes. Kenkel, Decicca and Liu (2011) analyze the amount of tax shift for cigarette consumption of occasional and 
daily smokers. The authors find that the burden of taxation is shifted at high rates, above 100%, onto non-daily 
smokers in comparison with addicted smokers.  
Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002) study the shifting of excise duties’ increase on alcohol beverages in the last 
quarter of 1997 in various US cities. They find that for beer, spirits and wine tax, overshifting occurs. Kenkel (2005) 
analyses the impact of excise duty increases on alcohol in Alaska. The author finds that in all cases of excise tax rate 
increase, the tax burden was overshifted towards end-consumers. Kenkel (2005) analyses the process of shifting in 
both perfectly competitive and imperfect markets. He finds that in perfectly competitive markets with constant 
marginal costs, taxes are shifted one-for-one to the final price, meaning that there is a full shifting of tax burden. 
Conversely, for imperfect competition, because of the market structure and demand conditions, the tax burden is 
overshifted every time the state increases the excise tax for alcohol by 1 cent ranging from 1 to 4 cents to prices 
encountered by end-consumers. In a more recent study, Bergman and Hansen (2013) research the shifting of tax for 
six episodes of excise tax increases on alcohol in Denmark. The results of their empirical analysis are consistent 
with Kenkel (2005), in which overshifting was identified. However, the authors consider that there is no uniform 
impact of changes in excise duties, in which under and fully shifting is identified, which is exclusively explained by 
the context of market perfect or imperfect competitiveness. Bergman and Hansen (2013) consider that the process of 
overshifting strictly depends on factors such as the elasticity of demand function, the relative slopes of the marginal 
cost, the number of companies and their market power and the cost of entry. The results obtained by the researchers’ 
study shows that in the period 1997–2005, with six episodes of tax increase on alcohol beverages, the tax burden 
was either fully or over shifted towards end consumers.  
For the fuel market, it is important to note the contribution of Alm, Sennoga and Skidmore (2008), who analyze 
the excise tax incidence in the retail gasoline market for all 50 US states. The authors assume a perfect competition 
model in which the tax burden is fully shifted to consumers. In highly urbanized cities the authors identify the 
overshifting of excise duty on gasoline. Nerudova and Dobranschi (2014, 2015) research the issue of tax burden 
shifting, in which the authors show that there is a high potential in introducing a tax swap mechanism between 
payroll taxation and environmental levies.  
Chouinard and Perloff (2004) analyze the incidence of both federal and state gasoline taxes in the United States 
and find that the federal states imposed on gasoline consumption are equally supported by consumers and 
wholesalers. Compared with federal excise duty, the state gasoline tax burden falls primarily on consumers, to 
whom the tax burden tends to be overshifted. Kopczuk et al (2012) analyze the rate of pass-through in case of state 
diesel taxes and use changes in tax collection regime as a primary explanatory factor. The authors find that the pass-
through rate is higher if the point of tax collection is moved to the supplier level. Additionally, the rate of pass-
through tends to increase when the state decides that the tax should be remitted by the distributor compared with 
when it is remitted by the retailer. They conclude that the tax burden pass-through rate rises as the tax collection is 
moved up the supply chain. Marion and Muehlegger (2010) perform a detailed analysis on fuel tax incidence, 
mainly of diesel and gasoline in US market. Using a 20 year’s span of data from more than 23 states, the authors 
conclude that the excise duties for transport fuel are fully or ‘potentially’ more than fully shifted to final consumers.  
3. Data and Methodology 
The empirical analysis is focused on two the Czech Republic data. According to by Delipalla and Keen (2008) 
and Kenkel (2005) one of the methods used to capture a snapshot of tax shifting size is to analyze the impact of tax 
variations, such as the periodic increase or decrease in the tax rate. In those particular moments, it is possible to 
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observe how an exogenous factor (e.g., excise tax rate increase) affects the price policy and how the tax burden 
increase is shared among the market players, namely, suppliers and consumers. The empirical analysis is therefore 
focused on these two countries because of the presence of periodic transport fuel tax rate increases. This paper seeks 
to research the impact of the excise tax rate increase on the retail price of transport fuels.  
The dependent variable is the real tax-inclusive retail price of fuels (e.g., gasoline and diesel), and the 
independent variables are the excise duties and the price of crude oil, which serve as the main factors that determine 
the retail price of fuels in the analyzed countries. Our method follows the model used by Li, Linn and Muehlegger 
(2011), Kopczuk et al (2012) and Carbonier (2011). We do not use the before tax price of fuels because we focus 
our analysis on the price (e.g., the tax-inclusive price) that the buyer has to pay and how prices react to episodic tax 
rate increases. We would use the tax-exclusive price if our objective were to analyze how the price that the seller 
receives reacts to tax rate increases. We make two important assumptions to simplify the model: there is no tax 
evasion in the case of a fuel excise duty, and to exclude the problem of endogeneity, we assume that the state 
increases the excise tax rate to reduce pollution, regardless of the fuel price fluctuations. 
Regressing the tax-inclusive prices of fuels to the tax rates (e.g., excise duties), the obtained coefficient 
represents the fraction of the tax burden that is borne by the final consumers. Therefore, the interpretation of the 
results is as follows. If the coefficient obtained for excise duties impact on the price of fuels is equal to one, then 
there is a full shifting of the tax burden, through prices, towards end consumers. If the coefficient obtained is less 
than one, then the tax burden is shared between sellers and buyers. Finally, if the coefficient is greater than one, then 
the tax burden is overshifted towards the final consumers. We expect the tax burden applied on the consumption of 
fuels (e.g., gasoline and diesel) to be overshifted. One explanation for our expectations is the fact that a new tax rate 
increase will diminish the demand in the long run by increasing the prices; as a consequence, the retailers will 
increase the price by more than the tax rate to compensate for future losses due to lower demand. Another 
explanation for tax burden overshifting is the highly concentrated markets of fuel retailers, where the industry is 
dominated by few large players that are price makers and, in the context of a tax increase, tend to behave like a 
monopolist. 
The estimation equations are as follows: 
 
݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௚ ൌ ߙ ൅ߚଵ൫݁ݔܿ݅ݏ݁௚൯ ൅ߚଶሺ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௖௥௨ௗ௘ሻ ൅ ݀ ൅ ߳,  (1) 
 
݌ݎ݅ܿ݁ௗ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵሺ݁ݔܿ݅ݏ݁ௗሻ ൅ߚଶሺ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௖௥௨ௗ௘ሻ ൅ ݀ ൅ ߳ǡ (2) 
where ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௚ and ݁ݔܿ݅ݏ݁௚ represent the real price of gasoline for 1 litre of unleaded gasoline and the per litre excise 
duty for gasoline; ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁ௗ and ݁ݔܿ݅ݏ݁ௗ represent the real price of 1 litre of diesel and the per litre excise duty for 
diesel;݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௖௥௨ௗ௘represents the real price of 1 litre of crude oil;݀  represents the time dummy variable that is 
inserted into the equation to better fit the results corresponding to the period in whichthe tax rate increase took 
effect;ߙis aconstant; and ߳ is the error term.  
Before running the two equations (Eq. 1 and 2) for both countries, we control the time series for the unit root by 
using the Dickey and Fuller (hereafter, dfuller) test in Stata. All three variables are non-stationary according to the 
dfuller test. Estimating a multiple variable regression using non-stationary time series could lead to spurious 
regression. However, if there are time series with unit root, it is important to consider the presence of cointegration 
between the non-stationary variables. The literature regarding cointegration focuses on the temporal properties of 
the economic time series. Consequently, cointegration assumes that if there is a linear combination between two 
non-stationary variables for which the residuals are stationary, the variables are considered to be cointegrated. 
Murray (1994) clarifies the concept of cointegration that was first introduced by Granger (1981) and the link to the 
error-correction model discussed by Engle and Granger (1987). Therefore, although the prices of transport fuels and 
crude oil are non-stationary when taken individually, if the “distance” between these prices (e.g., the prices of 
gasoline and crude oil, respectively, and the prices of diesel and crude oil) is stationary, then we can consider these 
two variables to be cointegrated of order zero. To obtain a stationary time series from a variable that has a unit root 
of one, each variable must be differentiated n times, as we recall that the variables are integrated on the order of n. 
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To establish cointegration, each pair of variables must be integrated of the same order n. A combination of time 
series all integrated of order n is considered to be cointegrated if and only if there is a linear combination of the 
variables, solely with nonzero weights, that is integrated on an order of less than n (Murray, 1994). 
4. Results 
The Czech Republic instituted an excise duty rate increase at the beginning of 2010 from CZK 11.84 to CZK 
12.84 per liter of gasoline and an increase from CZK 9.95 to 10.95 per liter of diesel. The data regarding the retail 
price of selected transport fuels (e.g., unleaded gasoline and diesel) were provided by the Czech Society for Credit 
Cards (CCS) for the period 2009–2010 (available at www.ccs.cz) and includes average daily prices from more than 
3000 petrol stations across the country. The data regarding the excise tax for each fuel were extracted from the 
Czech tax law for the same 2009–2010 period. The data for crude oil price are based on the Spot Price Europe Brent 
provided by the US Energy Information Administration (US EIA). Furthermore, we assume the price for any “non-
business” day on stock exchange to be the closing price from Friday for each liter of unleaded gasoline, diesel and 
crude oil. All data are presented on a daily basis; the price of crude oil was transformed from US barrels to liters, 
and using the USD/CZK exchange rate, we transformed the prices from barrels to liters (1 barrel=158,98 l), 
expressed in CZK. Consequently, we calculated the real price of the selected variables using the data reported by 
Eurostat regarding the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the period 2005–2010, with the base year as 2005. All 
variables are expressed in CZK. Another innovation of our model is to use for comparability reasons the price of 
crude oil per liter transformed from USD to CZK, ultimately obtaining the adjusted market exchange rate between 
the currencies using the Purchase Power Parity index (hereinafter as PPP).  
In the case of the Czech Republic, after the retail prices are adjusted using the CPI, we control for stationarity in 
all three variables used to estimate the tax burden shifting, for the period 2009–2010. Using the dfuller test, all three 
variables have the unit root. Therefore, we choose to test using Vector Error Correction model (hereinafter as 
VECM) if the variables are cointegrated.  We assume that although all three variables–real fuel transport prices, 
excise duty rates and crude oil prices are non-stationary, the distance among them is stationary, which means that 
the random walk of transport fuel price follows the random walk of crude oil price and excise duties. Testing for 
cointegration is a two-step procedure. To determine whether there is a long-term relation in this model, namely the 
daily prices of transport fuel (e.g., gasoline and diesel), excise duty rates and daily prices of crude oil, it is necessary 
to determine the number of lags used for the VECM. Once we find a unit root for the transport fuel and crude oil 
prices, in accordance with Sukati (2013), we select the number of lags by using the varsoc command in Stata, which 
reports Akaike’s information criterion and Schwar’s Bayesian information criterion regarding the possible lags to be 
used. 
The test chooses 4 lags to explain the bi-variate model between the gasoline and crude oil prices. Using Stata to 
test the cointegration, we employ some of the software’s tests for cointegration. One command used is vecrank, 
which produces the statistic required to determine the number of cointegrating equations in the VECM. To solve the 
rank r of the model, we use the Johansen’s maximum likelihood estimator of the parameters of cointegration for the 
VECM, as suggested by Sukati (2013). The level of r=0 trace statistics exceed the critical value of the test; therefore, 
we reject the null hypothesis of not cointegrated equations. However, at the level r=1, where the trace statistics are 
less than the critical value, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is one cointegration relation between 
gasoline and crude oil prices.  
The Johansen test shows that there is indeed a long-term relationship among the analyzed variables for the Czech 
Republic. The retail price of transport fuels tends to follow the random walk of both excise duties and the price of 
crude oil as the main determinants. The long-term relationship for gasoline (priceg) and diesel (priced) retail prices 
and their determinants is given by the following equations: 
 
݌ݎ݅ܿ݁݃ ൌ ͵ǡ͸Ͳሺ݁ݔܿ݅ݏ݁௚ሻ െ ʹǤͻͻሺܿݎݑ݀݁ሻ െ Ͷͺሺ)   (3) 
 
݌ݎ݅ܿ݁݀ ൌ ͵ǡͲʹሺ݁ݔܿ݅ݏ݁ௗሻ െ ʹǡͷ͹ሺܿݎݑ݀݁ሻ െ ͵͹ሺ)   (4) 
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Thus, an increase in the crude oil prices will decrease the retail price of the analyzed fuels as a response to the 
decreased demand for oil and switching to other alternative source of energy. Additionally, the prices of transport 
fuels will increase over the long term as a response to the increase in rate of excise duties. However, a high value for 
the constant shows that the price of retail gasoline is driven by not only the price of crude oil but also other 
exogenous factors that affect the demand for this transport fuel. One of the most important such factor isthe set of 
indirect ad valorem and ad unit taxes that apply to gasoline in the Czech Republic. 
 Using a supplementary test vecnorm in Stata, we control for the null hypothesis that the errors are normally 
distributed. The results show that the errors are normally distributed according to the Jarque-Bera test, and there is 
no evidence for skewness and kurtosis. 
Gujarati (2004) recommends a simpler method to check for cointegration between non-stationary time series. 
We apply this method choosing the case of simple regression between the daily retail price of gasoline (priceg) and 
diesel (priced), the excise duties (݁ݔܿ݅ݏ݁௚ and ݁ݔܿ݅ݏ݁ௗሻ and the daily price of crude oil (crude) per litre in the Czech 
Republic over 2009–2010.  
According to Gujarati (2004), if both variables have a unit root, this can be considered a spurious regression. 
However, generating the residuals from the simple regression between the three variables and controlling for the 
unit root using the dfuller test we can reject the null hypothesis of non-stationary and thus conclude that the 
variables are cointegrated. 
Once the research proved that there is cointegration between the retail prices of gasoline crude oil and excise 
duties, we estimate the impact that excise duties on gasoline have on the retail price of this transport fuel by using 
the price of crude oil as the control variable.  
Table 1. The results regarding the impact of the excise duty rate increase on the retail price of gasoline in the Czech Republic, OLS estimation 
 
(1) 
priceg 
(2) 
priceg 
(3) 
priceg 
exciseg 0.556** 1.594*** 1.352*** 
(2.98) (8.55) (7.18) 
crude 1.427*** 1.212*** 
(21.39) (19.43) 
crudeadj 1.795*** 
(20.51) 
Time dummy No Yes Yes 
Observations 730 730 729 
Adjusted R-squared 0.68 0.74 0.749 
t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001;The time dummy variable correspond to the first 6 months of 2010 after the excise 
tax rate increase for gasoline in the Czech Republic 
 
We estimate three regressions, in the first column of the table no. 1, only the excise duty and the price of crude 
oil are included, and the time dummy variable is excluded. The coefficient for the excise duty for gasoline is lower 
than 1, which means that the tax burden is shared between the retailer and the endconsumer. However, in column 
two, the time dummy variable is included and takes the value of 1 for the first 6 months of 2010 to determine the 
impact of the tax rate increase on the retail price for the first half of that year. The coefficient of excise duty shows 
that the tax burden was indeed overshifted to the final consumers, exceeding the fullshifting threshold by 0.59 CZK 
for a 1 CZK tax rate increase that began on 1 January 2010. With the coefficient using the price of oil expressed in 
PPP (crudeadj), we observe that the overshifting coefficient of excise tax decreases to 0.32 CZK for the 1 CZK tax 
rate increase (see column 3, table 1), where the influence of the price of crude oil increases to 1.79 CZK for a 1 CZK 
increase, compared with the coefficient of 1.22 CZK that is obtained when the price of crude oil is transformed 
using market exchange rates (see column 2, Table no. 1). 
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For the retail price of diesel, we follow the same steps, where we regress the price of transport fuel to excise duty 
rates and the price of crude oil using the market exchange rates, excluding the time dummy variable.  
Table 2. The results regarding the impact of the excise duty rate increase on the retail price of diesel in the Czech Republic, OLS estimation 
  (1) (2) (3) 
priced priced priced 
excised 1.276*** 2.570*** 2.494*** 
(7.83) (18.12) (17.12) 
crude 0.889*** 0.621*** 
(15.25) (13.07) 
crudeadj 0.889*** 
(13.12) 
Time dummy No Yes Yes 
Observations 730 730 729 
Adjusted R-squared 0.644 0.781 0.781 
t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; The time dummy variable correspond to the first 6 months of 2010 after the excise 
tax rate increase for gasoline in the Czech Republic 
 
According to the first column of the Table no. 2, 1 CZK price increase for crude oil increases the retail price of 
diesel in the Czech Republic by 0,88 CZK. In the case of the excise duty, the increase of1 CZK caused this tax to be 
overshifted, and the price of diesel increased by 1.27 CZK. In the second column, we add the time dummy variable 
to test how the prices of diesel react to the excise duty increase in the first 6 months of 2010. The tax burden shifting 
increases dramatically in case of diesel price, where the 1 CZK increase in the excise tax rate increases the price of 
diesel by 2.57 CZK, thus confirming that the tax burden was overshifted. This coefficient of excise duty does not 
change significantly when we use the PPP adjusted price of crude oil (crudeadj), where the overshifting coefficient 
is slightly decreased to 2.49 CZK for a 1 CZK increase in excise duty rate (see column 3 in the Table no. 2). 
5. Discussion of results 
The design and scope of the excise duties is to decrease the consumption of harmful commodities. Consequently, 
by raising the price of such commodities, the intent is to internalize the external costs associated with their 
consumption. Although it is considered to be a detrimental treatment, corrective taxation should be borne 
exclusively by the final consumer because he is the only one responsible for negative externalities that result from 
consumption of such commodities. Therefore, the supplier is indeed entitled to fully shift the tax burden to end 
consumers through the price mechanism. However, for excise duties, deviations from the rule can appear due to 
factors such as market structure, market power and the availability of substitutes. One significant distortionary 
reaction of the market is the process of overshifting the tax burden, when the price of taxed goods rises by more than 
the tax rate or its increase; this means that the end consumer not only bears the full cost of taxation but is also 
paying for the future loss of the supplier from decreased demand as a response to increased prices. 
For environmental taxation, we assume that the exact social cost of one unit of pollution resulted from fossil fuel 
burning equalsݐ௫. In accordance with the Pigouvian principle of taxing the negative externalities, the tax rate should 
be equal to ݐ௫. Therefore, the external costs will be internalized into private costs and the result will be: 
 
ܲ ൌ ݌ ൅ ሺݐ௫ ൅ ݏሻ   (5) 
 
Where the marginal social cost (MSC) equals the marginal private cost (MPC) plus the external cost represented 
by the tax rate (ݐ௫) applied to 1 unit of harmful commodity (e.g., 1 liter of gasoline or diesel). This represents the 
Polluter Pay Principle, which states that the social cost of environmental damage should be fully borne by the 
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polluter. Therefore, it is justified to assume that the price should be P, where 1 liter of gasoline produces ݐ௫external 
costs, and the consumer that chooses to burn this unit of fuel should bear the full price of its activity, meaning  
Pൌ ݌ ൅ݐ௫, where his marginal private costs equals the marginal social cost. For simplicity of assessment let us 
ignore the other elements that affect Pigouvian taxes such as: social benefits’ share from producing and consuming 
‘dirty’ goods; the pre-existent distortionary taxes that increase the distortionary effect of environmental levies and 
the double impact of these taxes on the private equilibrium of harmful commodities supplier, as Buchanan and 
Stubblebine (1962) emphasize. We choose to focus on one particular process that appears for corrective taxation, the 
overshifting of tax burden.  
Suppose that an excise-duty-wise carbon taxation is imposed with tax rate of ݐ௫on a unit of pollution and 
overshifting occurs. In this case, the price of pollution will be: 
 
ܲ ൌ ݌ ൅ ሺݐ௫ ൅ ݏሻ  (6) 
 
Where P is the final price; p is the price before tax; ݐ௫ represents the environmental tax rate; and s is the 
overshifting coefficient. In this case the marginal social cost of the polluter is exceeded by his marginal private cost, 
which is augmented by the overshifting coefficient. The size of the overshifting coefficient (s) strongly depends on 
the amount of tax increase, market power and the price elasticity of demand. According to the primary research 
papers by Dahl (1993, 2011), Pock (2010) and more recently by Havranek and Kokes(2015), the demand elasticity 
with respect to price in market fuel is relatively inelastic, ranging from −0.14 to −0.3. Therefore, it is easy to infer 
that overshifting of the tax burden could occur. In a world of concentrated fuel markets (refineries, wholesalers and 
retailers) dominated by large companies, the market power is assumed to be LĮo, where L is the Lerner Index. This 
inferred conclusion shows a presence of oligopolistic behavior that is representative for the imperfect competitive 
markets, where large companies involved in this industry are price makers in comparison with small wholesalers 
and retailers, which tend to be price takers. Once we admit this oligopoly model for fuel market, then the assumption 
that overshifting will occur is easily demonstrated. If overshifting of excise duties for fuel occurs, the Pigovian 
principle that emphasizes corrective taxation is violated. This undesired market reaction does not correspond with 
the baseline policy that targets the pollution reduction. As shown by empirical analysis, the price of transport fuels 
tends to increase overall by more than the tax rate affecting the welfare of final consumers. This practice of 
overshifting represents a concealed form of overcharging the final consumers. 
Overcharging the end consumers using the context of tax increases creates an accentuated damage of consumer’s 
welfare that stretches beyond the internalization of external costs. Therefore, overshifting violates both the Pigovian 
principle of corrective taxation and Pareto optimality in resource distribution. Hence, the supplier’s surplus is 
increased at the expense of the consumer’s previously reduced utility due to the tax imposition. Overshifting can be 
viewed as a supra-taxation of the end consumers, where the seller can abusively increase his receipts and profits 
using the context of publicly decided tax increases on selected goods. The violation of Pigouvian Principle through 
overshifting increases the regressivity of environmental taxes, reduces the overall welfare and increases the 
distortionary costs of corrective taxation beyond the social benefits of pollution reduction. This evidence raises new 
questions, such as, if overshifting is identified, can we assume that the often accused distortionary corrective taxes 
(e.g., environmental taxes) are regressive because of this market reaction? Is the regressivity of environmental 
taxation enhanced by overshifting the tax burden? 
6. Conclusions 
The research in this paper is focused on the imperfect competitive markets of transport fuels. Starting with the 
assumption that imposing an excise tax will affect both consumers and suppliers to a certain degree, the main 
objective was to quantify the consumer’s and supplier’s respective shares of the resulting final tax burden. The 
research is based on an empirical analysis in selected countries and estimates the impact that the excise tax rate 
increases have on the retail prices of transport fuels. Our results strongly support the conclusion that the tax burden 
is shifted by more than 100% when a tax rate increase occurs. Thus, by overshifting the tax burden, in the case of 
environmental corrective taxation, the Pigovian principle is violated. 
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Opponents of the Pigovian principle consider these market-based tools to be distortionary and regressive and to 
create a supplementary excess burden by decreasing the value of labor and capital. Then, one can associate the 
process of overshifting with the direct decrease of labor returns, as the commodities artificially become more 
expensive when the Pigovian principle is exceeded. The outcome of imposing environmental taxation may prove to 
be the opposite from the outcome that is initially expected, as overshifting can increase profits at the expense of the 
final consumers due to overcharging. 
Observed from a different perspective, because of the distorted market reaction, the results obtained from this 
paper demonstrate that the correction of one market failure (negative externalities) can lead to another market failure 
(overshifting of the tax burden) and thus violate the Pigovian principle that was initially proposed. 
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